let to Austria in the
hope of securing the neutrality of Prussia and the friendship of
England. Accordingly he decided to send Talleyrand on a second mission
to London. That skilful diplomat had recently returned to Paris; and the
Foreign Minister drew up, perhaps in concert with him, a Memoir entitled
"Reflections on a Negotiation with England in case of War," which
provided the text for Talleyrand's discourse to Pitt and Grenville. The
gist of it is that Talleyrand must convince the British Government of
the need of a French attack on the Belgic provinces of Austria as the
sole means of safety. For, while offensive in appearance, it is in
reality defensive. France does not intend to keep those provinces; and,
even if her conquest of them brings about the collapse of the
Stadholder's power in Holland, England will do well not to intervene in
favour of the Orange _regime_. For what good can the Island Power gain
by war with France? She may take the French colonies; but that will mean
a tiresome struggle with the revolted negroes in the West Indies.
France, meanwhile, with her new-born strength, will conquer Central
Europe and then throw her energy into her fleet. The better course,
then, for England will be to remain neutral, even if Holland be
revolutionized, and the estuary of the Scheldt be thrown open to all
nations. Or, still better, England may help France to keep in check the
King of Prussia and the Prince of Orange. In that case the two free
Powers will march hand in hand and "become the arbiters of peace or war
for the whole world."

This remarkable pronouncement claims attention for several reasons.
Firstly, it proves that Dumouriez and Talleyrand believed their sole
chance of safety to lie in the conquest of Austria's Belgic provinces,
where a cognate people would receive them with open arms. That is to
say, they desired war with Austria, and they did not dread the prospect
of war with Prussia, provided that England remained neutral and
friendly. Pitt and Grenville were well aware of this from Gower's
despatches. Our ambassador had warned them that France recked little of
a war with the whole of Europe, provided that England held aloof.
Secondly, this fact disposes of the subsequent charge of Fox against
Pitt, that he ought to have sided with France in 1792 and thereby to
have prevented the attack of the German Powers. For, as we have seen, it
was she who took the irrevocable step of declaring war on Austria;