allest
details, the policy of British statesmen is branded before the tribunal
of history for all time.

But British diplomacy went further. At England's request Japan snatches
away heroic Kiao-Chau and violates the neutrality of China. Has England
interfered in this violation of neutrality? Has England shown a care for
neutral States in this case?

When, five years ago, I was called to office the Triple Alliance was
opposed by a firmly united Entente. England's work was designed to serve
the known principle of the balance of power, which means in plain German
that the principle, followed for centuries by British policy and
directed against the strongest Continental power, should find its
strongest tool in the Triple Entente. This proves from the beginning the
aggressive character of the Entente toward the plainly defensive
tendencies of the Triple Alliance.

This was the germ of the forcible explosion. German policy was obliged
to try to avert the danger of war by an understanding with the
individual powers of the Entente. At the same time she was obliged to
strengthen her defensive forces so that she should be prepared if war
should come all the same. We did both. In France we always encountered
ideas of revanche felt by ambitious politicians. With Russia some
agreements were concluded, but Russia's firm alliance with France, her
antagonism to us and our ally, Austria-Hungary, her Pan-Slavistic desire
for power, her artificial hatred for Germany, made it impossible to
conclude an agreement which in the case of a political crisis would
exclude the danger of war.

England was comparatively free. Here the best attempt at an
understanding could be made which would have effectively guaranteed the
peace of the world. I acted accordingly. The way was narrow, which I
knew well. For decades the British insular intellect has been evolving
the political principle, the dogma that the arbitrament of the world is
due to England, which she can only maintain by undisputed supremacy on
the sea and the much-quoted balance of power on the Continent.

I never hoped to break the old principle by persuasion. What I believe
possible was that the growing power of Germany and the growing danger of
war could be made to compel England to perceive that this old principle
was untenable and unpractical, and that a peaceable arrangement with
Germany was preferable, but that dogma always paralyzed the possibility
of an understanding. After the