an Empire should pledge itself to a
permanent inferiority at sea.

That empire would indeed have been more foolish even than cowardly had
it listened to any such proposals. The position, therefore, was one of
inevitable and increasing friction. It was a matter of life and death to
England that no other great Western fleet should exist besides the
French, and it was a matter of national existence to Germany once she
had undertaken a policy not to give up that policy at the dictation of
any other power--for, among other things, modern Germany lived on
prestige; her whole internal structure depended upon it, and for Prussia
to lose faith before Europe would be the end of the Germany that Prussia
had made.

There are those who say that a Germany conducted by some Richelieu, or
even by a surviving Bismarck, would never have attempted the building of
a great fleet until accounts had been finally settled with France. There
are those who say that the elements of statesmanship required the German
Empire first to settle herself politically upon the shores of the
Straits of Dover and the Netherlands, first to destroy the danger of a
great war in the west on land, then and then only to begin building that
fleet which must inevitably challenge Great Britain. It is no part of
this criticism to consider the statesmanship of another nation, but at
any rate once the policy of building the fleet was begun conflict with
England was in sight.

2. The second cause of England's joining in this war is the effect of a
number of internal arrangements, some of them of minor importance, but
all leading in one direction and ultimately placing the Government of
Great Britain in a position from which it was difficult to retire. In
general terms these arrangements were based upon the idea of joining the
group of powers, French and Russian, which formed the counterpoise to
the Germanic group in Europe, the German Empire and Austria. At the same
time there was running through these arrangements the idea of detaching
Italy, whose Government was firmly attached to Germany, but whose
population was very doubtful, from the Triple Alliance of Germany,
Austria, and Italy, which had been the cardinal point in European
affairs for a generation.

The various steps by which Great Britain approached this position are
well known. In the first place, she came to an arrangement with France
whereby she should have a free hand in Egypt and France should be
suppor