tish Navy which in
all history has been used for such purely defensive purposes as the
British Navy has been used during the present generation, and this
moderation I conceive to be due to a clear recognition that morally the
claim to supremacy at sea is a challenge which the great rival nations
must feel acutely, and which they have a right to feel acutely, and
which, therefore, must be softened in every possible way.

But if it is necessary that Great Britain should brook no rival at sea
it is still more necessary that such a rival, should he arise, should
not have naval bases within striking distance of her coast. The great
exception has, of course, been France, and for two centuries at least
that fact has molded the whole of British policy. Had Germany remained a
Continental power and rejected maritime ambition that would still
continue to mold British policy.

The French have, and Europe being what it is, will always continue to
have the aptitude for the sea, the genius in mechanical invention and
the superabundant wealth which between them are the three factors of the
great modern fleet. A lengthy coast line training millions of her
workers to a seafaring life, a long tradition of naval families, and
pioneer in every form of modern naval war from the armor plate to the
submarine, is the proof of this, if proof were needed.

As against the presence of some part of the French naval power on an
opposing coast across a narrow armed water, the English Channel, Great
Britain proceeded, generation after generation, to keep her control an
essentially defensive naval force. She did it upon the position that her
military effort, and therefore expenditure, should be slight; that her
economic as her other energies should be chiefly devoted to her marine.

And though the French in the moments of their greatest prosperity were
able, for all their constant military effort, to produce navies that
rivaled those of Great Britain, yet Great Britain's effort was the more
constant. She never engaged large bodies of men in war; she could take
advantage of every French reverse during the two centuries when the
French were perpetually engaged in huge Continental conflicts.

Great Britain, in a word, by ceaseless vigilance and at a great expense
of energy, managed upon the whole to dominate one branch of the narrow
seas, the channel. Upon the other branch, the North Sea, she felt nearly
always secure. An exception to this security was