Smith. He would now proceed to state his objections to the clause
just read, (section 2, of article 1, clause 3.) His objections were
comprised under three heads: 1st, the rule of apportionment is unjust;
2d, there is no precise number fixed on, below which the house shall
not be reduced; 3d, it is inadequate. In the first place, the rule of
apportionment of the representatives is to be according to the whole
number of the white inhabitants, with three-fifths of all others; that
is, in plain English, each State is to send representatives in
proportion to the number of freemen, and three-fifths of the slaves it
contains. He could not see any rule by which slaves were to be
included in the ratio of representation;--the principle of a
representation being that every free agent should be concerned in
governing himself, it was absurd to give that power to a man who could
not exercise it--slaves have no will of their own: the very operation
of it was to give certain privileges to those people, who were so
wicked as to keep slaves. He knew it would be admitted, that this rule
of apportionment was founded on unjust principles, but that it was the
result of accommodation; which, he supposed, we should be under the
necessity of admitting, if we meant to be in union with the southern
States, though utterly repugnant to his feelings.

Mr. Hamilton. In order that the committee may understand clearly the
principles on which the General Convention acted, I think it necessary
to explain some preliminary circumstances.

Sir, the natural situation of this country seems to divide its
interests into different classes. There are navigating and
non-navigating States--the Northern are properly the navigating
States: the Southern appear to possess neither the means; nor the
spirit of navigation. This difference of situation naturally produces
a dissimilarity of interest and views respecting foreign commerce. It
was the interest of the Northern States that there should be no
restraints on their navigation, and that they should leave full power,
by a majority in Congress, to make commercial regulations in favor of
their own, and in restraint of the navigation of foreigners. The
Southern States wished to impose a restraint on the Northern, by
requiring that two-thirds in Congress should be requisite to pass an
act in regulation of commerce: they were apprehensive that the
restraints of a navigation law would discourage foreigners, and by
obligi