ad leading through the
forest in his rear. He also committed a fault which might have proved
the destruction of all his army, without its ever having commenced the
campaign, or being drawn out in battle; he allowed himself to be
surprised. On the 15th I was at Charleroi, and had beaten the Prussians
without his knowing anything about it. I had gained forty-eight hours of
manoeuvres upon him, which was a great object; and if some of my generals
had shown that vigour and genius which they had displayed on other
occasions, I should have taken his army in cantonments without ever
fighting a battle. But they were discouraged, and fancied that they saw
an army of 100,000 men everywhere opposed to them. I had not time enough
myself to attend to the minutiae of the army. I counted upon surprising
and cutting Wellington up in detail. I knew of Bulow's arrival at eleven
o'clock, but I did not regard it. I had still eighty chances out of a
hundred in my favour. Notwithstanding the great superiority of force
against me I was convinced that I should obtain the victory, I had about
70,000 men, of whom 15,000 were cavalry. I had also 260 pieces of
cannon; but my troops were so good that I esteemed them sufficient to
beat 120,000. Of all those troops, however, I only reckoned the English
as being able to cope with my own. The others I thought little of.
I believe that of English there were from 35,000 to 40,000. These I
esteemed to be as brave and as good as my own troops; the English army
was well known latterly on the Continent, and besides, your nation
possesses courage and energy. As to the Prussians, Belgians, and others,
half the number of my troops, were sufficient to beat them. I only left
34,000 men to take care of the Prussians. The chief causes of the loss
of that battle were, first of all, Grouchy's great tardiness and neglect
in executing his orders; next, the 'grenadiers a cheval' and the cavalry
under General Guyot, which I had in reserve, and which were never to
leave me, engaged without orders and without my knowledge; so that after
the last charge, when the troops were beaten and the English cavalry
advanced, I had not a single corps of cavalry in reserve to resist them,
instead of one which I esteemed to be equal to double their own number.
In consequence of this the English attacked, succeeded, and all was lost.
There was no means of rallying. The youngest general would not have
committed the fault of leaving an army