muhl decided the fate of a war. The battle of the Moskwa was that
in which the greatest talent was displayed, and by which we obtained the
fewest advantages. Waterloo, where everything failed, would, had victory
crowned our efforts, have saved France and given peace to Europe."

Madame Montholon having inquired what troops he considered the best,
"Those which are victorious, madam," replied the Emperor. "But," added
he, "soldiers are capricious and inconstant, like you ladies. The best
troops were the Carthaginians under Hannibal, the Romans under the
Scipios, the Macedonians under Alexander, and the Prussians under
Frederick." He thought, however, that the French soldiers were of all
others those which could most easily be rendered the best, and preserved
so. "With my complete guard of 40,000 or 50,000 men I would have
undertaken to march through Europe. It is perhaps possible to produce
troops as good as those that composed my army of Italy and Austerlitz,
but certainly none can ever surpass them."

The anniversary of the battle of Waterloo produced a visible impression
on the Emperor. "Incomprehensible day!" said he, dejectedly;
"concurrence of unheard-of fatalities! Grouchy, Ney, D'Erlon--was there
treachery or was it merely misfortune? Alas! poor France!" Here he
covered his eyes with his hands. "And yet," said he, "all that human
skill could do was accomplished! All was not lost until the moment when
all had succeeded." A short time afterwards, resuming the subject, he
exclaimed, "In that extraordinary campaign, thrice, in less than a week,
I saw the certain triumph of France slip through my fingers. Had it not
been for a traitor I should have annihilated the enemy at the outset of
the campaign. I should have destroyed him at Ligny if my left wing had
only done its duty. I should have destroyed him again at Waterloo if my
right had seconded me. Singular defeat, by which, notwithstanding the
most fatal catastrophe, the glory of the conquered has not suffered."

We shall here give Napoleon's own opinion of the battle of Waterloo.
"The plan of the battle," said he, "will not in the eyes of the
historian reflect any credit on Lord Wellington as a general. In the
first place, he ought not to have given battle with the armies divided.
They ought to have been united and encamped before the 15th. In the
next, the choice of ground was bad; because if he had been beaten he
could not have retreated, as there was only one ro