ls. One hundred and fifty carriages, each with six horses, were
employed in this service, which confirmed me in the belief I had
previously entertained, that the English were to join with the Russians
in an expedition against Holland. The aim of the Anglo-Russians was to
make a diversion which might disconcert the movements of the French
armies in Germany, the allies being at that time unacquainted with the
peace concluded at Presburg. Not a moment was therefore to be lost in
uniting the whole of our disposable force for the defence of Holland; but
it is not of this expedition that I mean to speak at present. I only
mention it to afford some idea of our situation at Hamburg, surrounded,
as we then were, by Swedish, English, and Russian troops. At this period
the Russian Minister at Hamburg, M. Forshmann, became completely insane;
his conduct had been more injurious than advantageous to his Government.
He was replaced by M. Alopcous, the Russian Minister at Berlin; and they
could not have exchanged a fool for a more judicious and able
diplomatist.

I often received from the Minister of Marine letters said packets to
transmit to the Isle of France,(Mauritius) of which the Emperor was
extremely anxious to retain possession; and I had much trouble in finding
any vessels prepared for that colony by which I could forward the
Minister's communications. The death of Pitt and the appointment of
Fox as his successor had created a hope of peace. It was universally
known that Mr. Fox, in succeeding to his office, did not inherit the
furious hatred of the deceased Minister against France and her Emperor.
There moreover existed between Napoleon and Mr. Fox a reciprocal esteem,
and the latter had shown himself really disposed to treat. The
possibility of concluding a peace had always been maintained by that
statesman when he was in opposition to Mr. Pitt; and Bonaparte himself
might have been induced, from the high esteem he felt for Mr. Fox, to
make concessions from which he would before have recoiled. But there
were two obstacles, I may say almost insurmountable ones. The first was
the conviction on the part of England that any peace which might be made
would only be a truce, and that Bonaparte would never seriously
relinquish his desire of universal dominion. On the other side, it was
believed that Napoleon had formed the design of invading England. Had he
been able to do so it would have been less with the view of striking a
blow