nsmitted to the Government the same news which it
transmitted to me, not supposing that I previously knew it. Thus, for
example, I thought I was apprising the Government of the arming of
Austria, of which I received information from headquarters a few days
after.
During the Prussian campaign Austria played precisely the same waiting
game which Prussia had played clueing the campaign of Austria. As
Prussia had, before the battle of Austerlitz, awaited the success or
defeat of the French to decide whether she should remain neutral or
declare herself against France, so Austria, doubtless supposing that
Russia would be more fortunate as the ally of Prussia than she had been
as her ally, assembled a corps of 40,000 men in Bohemia. That corps was
called an army of observation; but the nature of these armies of
observation is well known; they belong to the class of armed
neutralities, like the ingenious invention of sanitary cordons. The fact
is, that the 40,000 men assembled in Bohemia were destined to aid and
assist the Russians in case they should be successful (and who can blame
the Austrian Government for wishing to wash away the shame of the Treaty
of Presburg?). Napoleon had not a moment to lose, but this activity
required no spur; he had hastened the battle of Austerlitz to anticipate
Prussia, and he now found it necessary to anticipate Russia in order to
keep Austria in a state of indecision.
The Emperor, therefore, left Warsaw about the end of January, and
immediately gave orders for engaging the Russian army in the beginning of
February; but, in spite of his desire of commencing the attack, he was
anticipated. On the 8th of February, at seven in the morning, he was
attacked by the Russians, who advanced during a terrible storm of snow,
which fell in large flakes. They approached Preussich-Eylau, where the
Emperor was, and the Imperial Guard stopped the Russian column. Nearly
the whole French army was engaged in that battle-one of the most
sanguinary ever fought in Europe. The corps commanded by Bernadotte was
not engaged, in the contest; it had been stationed on the left at
Mohrungen, whence it menaced Dantzic. The issue of the battle would have
been very different had the four, divisions of infantry and the two of
cavalry composing Bernadotte's corps arrived in time; but unfortunately
the officer instructed to convey orders to Bernadotte to march without
delay on Preussich-Eylau was taken by a body of Cossacks;
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