he enemy's territory, nor
to fall upon some one of his invading columns. Not only was the
defensive strictly maintained, but an effort was made to defend every
inch of the border. In the face of superior forces concentrating for
invasion at certain points, a skirmish line, which employed all of our
forces, was thrown out to hold all points from Richmond to the Western
prairies.
But one original and cardinal error gave birth to all the others. The
Confederate Government failed to invoke the only spirit which could have
done its bidding. It ought, with out delay, to have stimulated the ardor
and turned loose the tremendous energies of revolution, and have made
the people drunken with its inspiration. The time was propitious, the
Government was just established and was popular, the people were,
practically, unanimous, and were irretrievably committed to the
movement--they had never seen hostile troops or been daunted by the
sights of war. The presence of formidable armed foes might have aroused
prudence, but when Sumpter fell and war became inevitable, there were no
armies in the field on either side. When the first gun boomed, the
Government ought to have taken advantage of the glow of enthusiasm which
was as yet unchilled by any fear of the yet distant danger. It ought to
have asked for powers which the people in their, then, thorough
confidence in their leaders would have readily granted. They felt, that
if the struggle was really for important principles and vital rights, it
was better to make rulers of their own choice, omnipotent for a short
time, than to run the risk of defeat which would cause them entire, and,
perhaps eternal, loss of liberty. The leaders knew that the temper of
the people could be relied on--that if frankly told that success could
be achieved only by prompt and enormous efforts and sacrifices--the
efforts and sacrifices would be made. They were made later, when instead
of universal hope and enthusiasm, there prevailed a feeling of almost
despair. The strategy of revolution is identical, in principle, with
that of war--the side which masses and marches fast wins. If, while it
was yet a contest of peoples and not yet a conflict of armies, the
entire white population of the South had been aroused, her territory
converted into one vast camp, every male citizen between the ages of
sixteen and sixty made a soldier, leaving to the President the power of
exempting certain classes, and not regulating by
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