rce from without, and which, when set in action, performs
the various operations for which its structure fits it, namely, to live,
move, feel, and think. This view, however, always has been strongly
opposed by those who accept on theological grounds a spiritualistic
doctrine, or what is, perhaps, more usual, a theory which combines
spiritualism and materialism in the doctrine of a composite nature in
man, animal as to the body and in some measure as to the mind, spiritual
as to the soul. It may be useful, as an illustration of one opinion on
this subject, to continue here the citation of Dr Prichard's comparison
between man and the lower animals:--

"If it be inquired in what the still more remarkable difference
consists, it is by no means easy to reply. By some it will be said
that man, while similar in the organization of his body to the lower
tribes, is distinguished from them by the possession of an immaterial
soul, a principle capable of conscious feeling, of intellect and
thought. To many persons it will appear paradoxical to ascribe the
endowment of a soul to the inferior tribes in the creation, yet it is
difficult to discover a valid argument that limits the possession of
an immaterial principle to man. The phenomena of feeling, of desire
and aversion, of love and hatred, of fear and revenge, and the
perception of external relations manifested in the life of brutes,
imply, not only through the analogy which they display to the human
faculties, but likewise from all that we can learn or conjecture of
their particular nature, the superadded existence of a principle
distinct from the mere mechanism of material bodies. That such a
principle must exist in all beings capable of sensation, or of
anything analogous to human passions and feelings, will hardly be
denied by those who perceive the force of arguments which
metaphysically demonstrate the immaterial nature of the mind. There
may be no rational grounds for the ancient dogma that the souls of the
lower animals were imperishable, like the soul of man: this is,
however, a problem which we are not called upon to discuss; and we may
venture to conjecture that there may be immaterial essences of divers
kinds, and endowed with various attributes and capabilities. But the
real nature of these unseen principles eludes our research: they are
only known to us by their external manifestations. These
manifestations are t