diately in the right rear of General Sherman was camped the veteran
division of General McClernand. About two miles further back, and about
a mile from the river, was stationed the reserve, consisting of two
divisions, Hurlbut's and W. H. L. Wallace's, formerly C. F. Smith's.
Across Owl Creek, and seven or eight miles off, was camped General Lew
Wallace's division. It was so far away as not to be in easy supporting
distance.

On April 1st, our division was marched to an open field, and there
carefully reviewed by General Grant. This was our first sight of the
victor of Donelson. Friday, the 4th of April, was a sloppy day, and
just before sundown we heard firing off towards Sherman's division. We
fell into line and started toward the front. After we had marched about
a mile, pitch darkness came on. Presently, a staff officer directed a
counter-march back to camp, saying it was only a rebel reconnoisance.
It was a nasty march back in the mud, dense woods, and thick darkness.

All this day the Confederate army was struggling through the woods and
mud, on its march from Corinth to attack us. It was the expectation of
General Johnston and his subordinates to cover the intervening space
between the two armies in this one day and attack early Saturday
morning; but the difficulties of the march was such, that he did not
make more than half the distance, and had to go into camp for the
night. Saturday was a reasonably pleasant day, but General Johnston's
troops had got so entangled in the forests, he did not feel justified
in attacking until all his preparations were made, which took the whole
of Saturday. He then moved up to within a mile or two of Sherman and
Prentiss, and went into camp _within sound of our drums_.

The delay had been so great that Beauregard now advised a countermarch
back to Corinth. He represented that our forces had surely been
appraised of their march, and it would be too late now to effect a
surprise; that they would undoubtedly find us all prepared, and
probably behind breastworks and other obstructions. General Johnston
was smarting under the criticisms of the campaign which resulted in the
loss of Donelson. His courage and military instinct told him that now
was the time to strike. He felt, too, that a bold stroke was necessary
to redeem the fortunes of the Confederacy and his own reputation. His
resolution was to conquer or die; and he replied to Beauregard: "We
shall attack at daylight to-morrow.