should rally.
Advantage would have been taken of the ground, and trees felled with
the tops outwards, through which an attacking force would have, with
great difficulty, to struggle. And later in the war, as a matter of
precaution, and because of the proximity of the enemy, breastworks
would have been thrown up. All this could have been done in a few
hours. Our flanks were so well protected that no troops were needed
there, and in case of attack, each division commander should have had
his place in the front, to which to immediately march his command;
while, the line being not more than three miles long at the very
outside estimate, there were abundant forces to man it thoroughly,
leaving a large force in the reserve to reinforce a point imperiled.

Why was not this done? It is hard to find an answer. General Sherman's
division was at the extreme front. It was being organized. The enemy
was not more than twenty-two miles away, and was known to be
concentrating from all the West. Yet this general, who afterwards
acquired such fame as a consummate master of the art of war, took no
precautions whatever, not even thoroughly scouting the ground in his
front. His pickets could not have been out more than a mile. General
Prentiss' division was also in process of organization, and he, like
Sherman, was in advance, and on Sherman's left. The complete absence of
the ordinary precautions, always taken by military commanders since the
beginning of history, is inexplicable. The only reason I can conjecture
for it grows out of the character of General Grant and his
distinguished subordinate, and their inexperience. They had had then
little practical knowledge of actual warfare. General Sherman, except
on one occasion, had never heard a hostile gun fired. They had to learn
their art, and the country and their army had to pay the cost of their
teaching. Happily, they were able to profit by every lesson, and soon
had no equals among our commanders. But because they have since
deserved so well of their country, is no reason why history should be
silent as to their mistakes. The Confederates would have made a great
mistake in attacking us at all in such a position, if we had been
prepared to receive them. But this want of preparation prevented us
from taking advantage of the opportunity, and inflicting a crushing
defeat upon the South. By it the war was prolonged, and every village
and hamlet in the West had its house of mourning.

Imme