d
was probably more relied upon by Grant and Halleck than was Prentiss?
In fact it is not at all improbable that Grant wholly relied upon the
two division commanders at the front, particularly Sherman, to keep him
posted as to the movements of the hostile army. General Sherman
reported on Saturday that he thought there were about two regiments of
infantry and a battery of artillery about six miles out. As a matter of
fact, the whole rebel army was not more than six miles out. Later in
the day he dispatches: "The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it
yesterday, and will not press our pickets far. I do not apprehend
anything like an attack on our position."

A tolerably extensive reading of campaigns and military histories
justifies me in saying that such an exhibition of unsuspicious security
in the presence of a hostile army is without a parallel in the history
of warfare.

How was it with our army? We knew the enemy to be at Corinth, but there
had been no intimation of advance; and no army could get over the
intervening space in less than two days, of which, of course, it was
the duty of our generals to have ample notice. Usually, before a
battle, there seems to be something in the very air that warns the
soldier and officer of what is coming, and to nerve themselves for the
struggle; but most of us retired this Saturday night to our blankets in
as perfect fancied security as ever enveloped an army.

But this was not true of all. A sense of uneasiness pervaded a portion
of the advance line. Possibly there had been too much noise in the
woods in front, possibly that occult sense, which tells us of the
proximity of another, warned them of the near approach of a hostile
army. Some of the officers noticed that the woods beyond the pickets
seemed to be full of Rebel cavalry. General Prentiss was infected with
this uneasiness, and at daylight on Sunday morning sent out the
Twenty-first Missouri to make an observation towards Corinth.

This regiment, proceeding through the forest, ran plump upon the
Confederate skirmish line, which it promptly attacked. Immediately the
Missourians saw an army behind the skirmish line advancing upon them.
They could hold their ground but for a moment. The enemy's advance
swept them back, and, like an avalanche, the Confederate army poured
into the camps of Sherman's and Prentiss' divisions.

At the first fire our men sprang to arms. By the time the enemy had
reached our camps many regi