rmony,
in the railway arrangements for the transport of troops.
[Footnote 35: By the Prussian law of November 9, 1867, soldiers had to
serve three years with the colours, four in the reserve, and five in the
Landwehr. Three new army corps (9th, 10th, and 11th) were formed in the
newly annexed or confederated lands, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Saxony, etc.
(Maurice, _The Franco-German War_, 1900).]
The General Staff of the North German Army had used these advantages to
the utmost, by preparing a most complete plan of mobilisation--so
complete, in fact, that the myriad orders had only to be drawn from
their pigeon-holes and dated in the last hours of July 15. Forthwith the
whole of the vast machinery started in swift but smooth working.
Reservists speedily appeared at their regimental depots, there found
their equipment, and speedily brought their regiments up to the war
footing; trains were ready, timed according to an elaborate plan, to
carry them Rhinewards; provisions and stores were sent forward, _ohne
Hast, ohne Rast_, as the Germans say; and so perfect were the plans on
rail, river, and road, that none of those blocks occurred which
frequently upset the plans of the French. Thus, by dint of plodding
preparation, a group of federal States gained a decisive advantage over
a centralised Empire which left too many things to be arranged in the
last few hours.
Herein lies the true significance of the War of 1870. All Governments
that were not content to jog along in the old military ruts saw the need
of careful organisation, including the eventual control of all needful
means of transport; and all that were wise hastened to adapt their
system to the new order of things, which aimed at assuring the swift
orderly movement of great masses of men by all the resources of
mechanical science. Most of the civilised States soon responded to the
new needs of the age; but a few (among them Great Britain) were content
to make one or two superficial changes and slightly increase the number
of troops, while leaving the all-important matter of organisation almost
untouched; and that, too, despite the vivid contrast which every one
could see between the machine-like regularity of the German mobilisation
and the chaos that reigned on the French side.
Outwardly, the French army appeared to be beyond the reach of criticism.
The troops had in large measure seen active service in the various wars
whereby Napoleon III. fulfilled his promis
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