they
often wandered widely before finding their regiments on the way to the
frontier. One general officer hunted about on the frontier for a command
which did not exist. As a result of this lack of organisation, and of
that control over the railways which the Germans had methodically
enforced, France lost the many advantages which her compact territory
and excellent railway system ought to have ensured over her more
straggling and poorer rival.

The loss of time was as fatal as it was singular under the rule of a
Napoleon whose uncle had so often shattered his foes by swift movements
of troops. In 1870 Napoleonic France had nothing but speed and dash on
which to count. Numbers were against her. In 1869 Marshal Leboeuf had
done away with the Garde Mobile, a sort of militia which had involved
only fifteen days' drill in the year; and the Garde Nationale of the
towns was less fit for campaigning than the re-formed Mobiles proved to
be later on in the war. Thus France had no reserves: everything rested
on the 330,000 men struggling towards the frontiers. It is doubtful
whether there were more than 220,000 men in the first line by August 6,
with some 50,000 more in reserve at Metz, etc.

Against them Germany could at once put into the field 460,000 infantry,
56,000 cavalry, with 1584 cannon; and she could raise these forces to
some 1,180,000 men by calling out all the reserves and Landwehr. These
last were men who had served their time and had not, as a rule, lost
their soldierly qualities in civil life. Nearly 400,000 highly trained
troops were ready to invade France early in August.

In view of these facts it seems incredible that Ollivier, the French
Prime Minister, could have publicly stated that he entered on war with a
light heart. Doubtless, Ministers counted on help from Austria or Italy,
perhaps from both; but, as it proved, they judged too hastily. As was
stated in Chapter I. of this work, Austria was not likely to move as
long as Russia favoured the cause of Prussia; for any threatening
pressure of the Muscovites on the open flank of the Hapsburg States,
Galicia, has sufficed to keep them from embarking on a campaign in the
West. In this case, the statesmen of Vienna are said to have known by
July 20 that Russia would quietly help Prussia; she informed the
Hapsburg Government that any increase in its armaments would be met by a
corresponding increase in those of Russia. The meaning of such a hint
was clear; an