stretched from near the village of Medole in a north-easterly
direction across the high-road between Brescia and Mantua; while his
right wing was posted in the hilly country around Solferino. In fact,
his extreme right rested on the tower-crowned heights of Solferino,
where the forces of Austria two generations later maintained so
desperate a defence against the onset of Napoleon III. and his
liberating army.
Owing to the non-arrival of Mezaros' corps marching from Legnago,
Wuermser mustered scarcely twenty-five thousand men on his long line;
while the very opportune approach of part of Serurier's division,
under the lead of Fiorella, from the south, gave the French an
advantage even in numbers. Moreover, Fiorella's advance on the south
of Wuermser's weaker flank, that near Medole, threatened to turn it and
endanger the Austrian communications with Mantua. The Imperialists
seem to have been unaware of this danger; and their bad scouting here
as elsewhere was largely responsible for the issue of the day.
Wuermser's desire to stretch a helping hand to Quosdanovich near Lonato
and his confidence in the strength of his own right wing betrayed him
into a fatal imprudence. Sending out feelers after his hard-pressed
colleague on the north, he dangerously prolonged his line, an error in
which he was deftly encouraged by Bonaparte, who held back his own
left wing. Meanwhile the French were rolling in the other extremity of
the Austrian line. Marmont, dashing forward with the horse artillery,
took the enemy's left wing in flank and silenced many of their pieces.
Under cover of this attack, Fiorella's division was able to creep up
within striking distance; and the French cavalry, swooping round the
rear of this hard-pressed wing, nearly captured Wuermser and his staff.
A vigorous counterattack by the Austrian reserves, or an immediate
wheeling round of the whole line, was needed to repulse this brilliant
flank attack; but the Austrian reserves had been expended in the north
of their line; and an attempt to change front, always a difficult
operation, was crushed by a headlong charge of Massena's and
Augereau's divisions on their centre. Before these attacks the whole
Austrian line gave way; and, according to Colonel Graham, nothing but
this retreat, undertaken "without orders," saved the whole force from
being cut off. The criticisms of our officer sufficiently reveal the
cause of the disaster. The softness and incapacity of Wuer
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