hose of the republican generals.
Neither were the results of the Castiglione cycle of battles quite so
brilliant as have been represented. Wuermser and Quasdanovich lost in
all 17,000 men, it is true: but the former had re-garrisoned and
re-victualled Mantua, besides capturing all the French siege-train.
Bonaparte's primary aim had been to reduce Mantua, so that he might be
free to sweep through Tyrol, join hands with Moreau, and overpower the
white-coats in Bavaria. The aim of the Aulic Council and Wuermser had
been to relieve Mantua and restore the Hapsburg rule over Lombardy.
Neither side had succeeded. But the Austrians could at least point to
some successes; and, above all, Mantua was in a better state of
defence than when the French first approached its walls: and while
Mantua was intact, Bonaparte was held to the valley of the Mincio, and
could not deal those lightning blows on the Inn and the Danube which
he ever regarded as the climax of the campaign. Viewed on its material
side, his position was no better than it was before Wuermser's
incursion into the plains of Venetia.[62]
With true Hapsburg tenacity, Francis determined on further efforts for
the relief of Mantua. Apart from the promptings of dynastic pride, his
reasons for thus obstinately struggling against Alpine gorges, Italian
sentiment, and Bonaparte's genius, are wellnigh inscrutable; and
military writers have generally condemned this waste of resources on
the Brenta, which, if hurled against the French on the Rhine, would
have compelled the withdrawal of Bonaparte from Italy for the defence
of Lorraine. But the pride of the Emperor Francis brooked no surrender
of his Italian possessions, and again Wuermser was spurred on from
Vienna to another invasion of Venetia. It would be tedious to give an
account of Wuermser's second attempt, which belongs rather to the
domain of political fatuity than that of military history. Colonel
Graham states that the Austrian rank and file laughed at their
generals, and bitterly complained that they were being led to the
shambles, while the officers almost openly exclaimed: "We must make
peace, for we don't know how to make war." This was again apparent.
Bonaparte forestalled their attack. Their divided forces fell an easy
prey to Massena, who at Bassano cut Wuermser's force to pieces and sent
the _debris_ flying down the valley of the Brenta. Losing most of
their artillery, and separated in two chief bands, the Imp
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