es were practically expunged, sharpened the
desire of the Directory to compass England's ruin, an enterprise which
might serve to restore French credit and would certainly engage those
vehement activities of Bonaparte that could otherwise work mischief in
Paris. On his side he gladly accepted the command of the _Army of
England_.

"The people of Paris do not remember anything," he said to
Bourrienne. "Were I to remain here long, doing nothing, I should be
lost. In this great Babylon everything wears out: my glory has
already disappeared. This little Europe does not supply enough of
it for me. I must seek it in the East: all great fame comes from
that quarter. However, I wish first to make a tour along the
[northern] coast to see for myself what may be attempted. If the
success of a descent upon England appear doubtful, as I suspect it
will, the Army of England shall become the Army of the East, and I
go to Egypt."[92]

In February, 1798, he paid a brief visit to Dunkirk and the Flemish
coast, and concluded that the invasion of England was altogether too
complicated to be hazarded except as a last desperate venture. In a
report to the Government (February 23rd) he thus sums up the whole
situation:

"Whatever efforts we make, we shall not for some years gain the
naval supremacy. To invade England without that supremacy is the
most daring and difficult task ever undertaken.... If, having
regard to the present organization of our navy, it seems impossible
to gain the necessary promptness of execution, then we must really
give up the expedition against England, _be satisfied with keeping
up the pretence of it_, and concentrate all our attention and
resources on the Rhine, in order to try to deprive England of
Hanover and Hamburg:[93] ... or else undertake an eastern
expedition which would menace her trade with the Indies. And if
none of these three operations is practicable, I see nothing else
for it but to conclude peace with England."

The greater part of his career serves as a commentary on these
designs. To one or other of them he was constantly turning as
alternative schemes for the subjugation of his most redoubtable foe.
The first plan he now judged to be impracticable; the second, which
appears later in its fully matured form as his Continental System, was
not for the present feasible, because France was