d in their leader.
Then again he was fully aware of the inherent vice of the Austrian
situation. It was as if an unwieldy organism stretched a vulnerable
limb across the huge barrier of the Alps, exposing it to the attack of
a compacter body. It only remained for Bonaparte to turn against his
foes the smaller geographical features on which they too implicitly
relied. Beaulieu had retired beyond the Po and the Ticino, expecting
that the attack on the Milanese would be delivered across the latter
stream by the ordinary route, which crossed it at Pavia. Near that
city the Austrians occupied a strong position with 26,000 men, while
other detachments patrolled the banks of the Ticino further north, and
those of the Po towards Valenza, only 5,000 men being sent towards
Piacenza. Bonaparte, however, was not minded to take the ordinary
route. He determined to march, not as yet on the north of the River
Po, where snow-swollen streams coursed down from the Alps, but rather
on the south side, where the Apennines throw off fewer streams and
also of smaller volume. From the fortress of Tortona he could make a
rush at Piacenza, cross the Po there, and thus gain the Milanese
almost without a blow. To this end he had stipulated in the recent
terms of peace that he might cross the Po at Valenza; and now, amusing
his foes by feints on that side, he vigorously pushed his main columns
along the southern bank of the Po, where they gathered up all the
available boats. The vanguard, led by the impetuous Lannes, seized the
ferry at Piacenza, before the Austrian horse appeared, and scattered a
squadron or two which strove to drive them back into the river (May
7th).
Time was thus gained for a considerable number of French to cross the
river in boats or by the ferry. Working under the eye of their leader,
the French conquered all obstacles: a bridge of boats soon spanned
the stream, and was defended by a _tete de pont_; and with forces
about equal in number to Liptay's Austrians, the republicans advanced
northwards, and, after a tough struggle, dislodged their foes from the
village of Fombio. This success drove a solid wedge between Liptay and
his commander-in-chief, who afterwards bitterly blamed him, first for
retreating, and secondly for not reporting his retreat to
headquarters.
It would appear, however, that Liptay had only 5,000 men (not the
8,000 which Napoleon and French historians have credited to him), that
he was sent by Beauli
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