o his generals, ordering a
concentration of troops--these, of course, fighting so as to delay the
pursuit--towards the southern end of Lake Garda. This wise step
probably saved his isolated forces from disaster. It was at that point
that the Austrians proposed to unite their two chief columns and crush
the French detachments. But, by drawing in the divisions of Massena
and Augereau towards the Mincio, Bonaparte speedily assembled a
formidable array, and held the central position between the eastern
and western divisions of the Imperialists. He gave up the important
defensive line of the Adige, it is true; but by promptly rallying on
the Mincio, he occupied a base that was defended on the north by the
small fortress of Peschiera and the waters of Lake Garda. Holding the
bridges over the Mincio, he could strike at his assailants wherever
they should attack; above all, he still covered the siege of Mantua.
Such were his dispositions on July 29th and 30th. On the latter day he
heard of the loss of Brescia, and the consequent cutting of his
communications with Milan. Thereupon he promptly ordered Serurier, who
was besieging Mantua, to make a last vigorous effort to take that
fortress, but also to assure his retreat westwards if fortune failed
him. Later in the day he ordered him forthwith to send away his
siege-train, throwing into the lake or burying whatever he could not
save from the advancing Imperialists.
This apparently desperate step, which seemed to forebode the
abandonment not only of the siege of Mantua, but of the whole of
Lombardy, was in reality a masterstroke. Bonaparte had perceived the
truth, which the campaigns of 1813 and 1870 were abundantly to
illustrate--that the possession of fortresses, and consequently their
siege by an invader, is of secondary importance when compared with a
decisive victory gained in the open. When menaced by superior forces
advancing towards the south of Lake Garda, he saw that he must
sacrifice his siege works, even his siege-train, in order to gain for
a few precious days that superiority in the field which the division
of the Imperialist columns still left to him.
The dates of these occurrences deserve close scrutiny; for they
suffice to refute some of the exorbitant claims made at a later time
by General Augereau, that only his immovable firmness forced Bonaparte
to fight and to change his dispositions of retreat into an attack
which re-established everything. This extraord
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