uld, you be pinched in your argument,
you may make your retreat with a very good graces you were never
positive, and are now glad to be better informed.

26. This hath made some approve the socratical way of reasoning, where,
while you scarce affirm any thing, you can hardly be caught in an
absurdity; and though possibly you are endeavouring to bring over
another to your opinion, which is firmly fixed, you seem only to desire
information from him.

27. In order to keep that temper, which is so difficult and yet so
necessary to preserve, you may please to consider, that nothing can be
more unjust or ridiculous, than to be angry with another because he is
not of your opinion. The interests, education, and means, by which men
attain their knowledge, are so very different, that it is impossible
they should all think alike; and he has at least us much reason to be
angry with you, as you with him.

28. Sometimes to keep yourself cool, it may be of service to ask
yourself fairly, what might have been your opinion, had you all the
biases of education and interest your adversary may possibly have? But
if you contend for the honour of victory alone, you may lay down this as
an infallible maxim, That you cannot make a more false step, or give
your antagonists a greater advantage over you, than by falling into a
passion.

29. When an argument is over, how many weighty reasons does a man
recollect, which his heat and violence made him utterly forget?

It is yet more absurd to be angry with a man, because he does not
apprehend the force of your reasons, or give weak ones of his own. If
you argue for reputation, this makes your victory the easier; he is
certainly in all respects an object of your pity, rather than anger; and
if he cannot comprehend what you do, you ought to thank nature for her
favours, who has given you so much the clearer understanding.

30. You may please to add this consideration, that among your equals no
one values your anger, which only preys upon its master; and perhaps you
may find it not very consistent, either with prudence or your ease, to
punish yourself whenever you meet with a fool or a knave.

31. Lastly, if you propose to yourself the true end of argument, which
is information, it may be a seasonable check to your passion; for if you
search purely after truth, it will be almost indifferent to you where
you find it. I cannot in this place omit an observation which I have
often made, namely, tha