iven in Professor Bain's
_Mental and Moral Science_, it is stated that they are--

"as yet, nowhere fully expressed. They form part of the more
general doctrine of Evolution which he is engaged in working out;
and they are at present to be gathered only from scattered
passages. It is true that, in his first work, _Social Statics_, he
presented what he then regarded as a tolerably complete view of one
division of Morals. But without abandoning this view, he now
regards it as inadequate--more especially in respect of its basis."

Mr. Hutton, however, taking the bare enunciation of one part of this
basis, deals with it critically; and, in the absence of any exposition
by me, sets forth what he supposes to be my grounds for it, and proceeds
to show that they are unsatisfactory.

If, in his anxiety to suppress what he doubtless regards as a pernicious
doctrine, Mr. Hutton could not wait until I had explained myself, it
might have been expected that he would use whatever information was to
be had concerning it. So far from seeking out such information, however,
he has, in a way for which I cannot account, ignored the information
immediately before him.

The title which Mr. Hutton has chosen for his criticism is, "A
Questionable Parentage for Morals." Now he has ample means of knowing
that I allege a primary basis of Morals, quite independent of that
which he describes and rejects. I do not refer merely to the fact that
having, when he reviewed _Social Statics_,[33] expressed his very
decided dissent from this primary basis, he must have been aware that I
alleged it; for he may say that in the many years which have since
elapsed he had forgotten all about it. But I refer to the distinct
enunciation of this primary basis in that letter to Mr. Mill from which
he quotes. In a preceding paragraph of the letter, I have explained
that, while I accept utilitarianism in the abstract, I do not accept
that current utilitarianism which recognizes for the guidance of conduct
nothing beyond empirical generalizations; and I have contended that--

"Morality, properly so-called--the science of right conduct--has
for its object to determine _how_ and _why_ certain modes of
conduct are detrimental, and certain other modes beneficial. These
good and bad results cannot be accidental, but must be necessary
consequences of the constitution of things; and I conceive it to be
the b