ter; and, therefore, the
necessity of such extensive levies as we formerly raised, seems to be
in some measure superseded.

In what degree the forces of these States should be decreased, we do
not pretend to determine, leaving this to your Excellency's better
judgment. But from past experience it appears, that the States are
incapable of bringing into the field an army equal to that called for
by the last arrangement; or, if all the demands of Congress on the
States become merely pecuniary it does not seem probable that they can
or will furnish money for raising, equipping, and supporting such an
army.

We wish we were capable, from any information we are possessed of, to
assist your Excellency in the investigation of the subject with
respect to the probable designs or force of the enemy the next
campaign. This must in its nature depend upon contingencies at present
even beyond conjecture. At this time, therefore, in our apprehension,
the only solid grounds of procedure is to consider what force these
States are capable of producing.

Having thus, in general, mentioned the ideas which have arisen on the
subject, we beg to leave the matter to your consideration, and take
the liberty of proposing the following queries, after further stating
that it has been thought that it would be expedient, in case of a
reform, to lessen the number of regiments so as to make fewer
commissioned officers and privates in the regiments. It has been
supposed that a considerable saving would arise from this measure, by
not having so many officers in full pay, with their horses, servants,
baggage, and other consequent expenses in the field. Or if they remain
in quarters from want of commands, they are in a situation
disagreeable to their own feelings, and uselessly expensive to the
public. We presume that gentlemen qualified for staff officers, and
that artificers and other persons employed by the staff department,
should not come into the calculation, as the officers at the head of
those departments should be enabled to carry on their business without
taking men from the line, a practice introduced from necessity, very
prejudicial to discipline, and productive of pernicious consequences
by lessening the effective force of the army.

Quere 1. Is a reduction of the number of the officers and men, as
fixed by the last arrangement, expedient or proper?

2. How can the reduction be brought about, consistently with the good
of the service? a