ce and firmness in that measure, which will create confidence in
the future acts of the United States.

Whatever principles may be established for settling these accounts,
and however just they may be, many doubts will arise in the
application of them. It must always be remembered, that the States are
independent; and that while they are pressed to a compliance with
their duty, they must have full evidence, that Congress act fairly. It
might therefore be proper, that for the settlement of their accounts,
Commissioners should be chosen as follows; one by the State, one by
the United States, one by the other two, and the decision of the
majority to be final.

Hitherto I have taken no notice of the specific supplies called for
from the several States. Many of these have been furnished, and many
remain to be provided. I would exclude them entirely from the other
public accounts; but as the apportionment so often mentioned, will
give a rule to go by, I shall continue to press for the supplies; or
where they are not wanted, make such composition with the States in
lieu of those which remain to be furnished, as the public service
shall render most eligible.

I have observed, that the public debts ought to be excepted from the
apportionment of past expenses. The reason is clear. Those debts, or
at least a great part of them, may subsist until the relative wealth
of the States has entirely changed. Those who are now most rich, may
become poor, and those who are poor, may become rich. This is not all;
these debts are hitherto unfunded. The creditors have indeed the
general promise of government, and some of them have certificates as
evidences of that promise; but until measures are taken to provide
solid funds for the final payment, the public credit must languish. To
an enlightened mind, it is needless to debate on the advantages
resulting from national credit. Congress will doubtless pursue the
steps necessary for its perfect establishment. And this cannot be
otherwise accomplished, than by raising taxes in hard money from
sources which must be productive and increasing. Those taxes must be
so bound to the public creditors for the debts due to them, that the
produce cannot be diverted. These taxes ought to be raised from the
same articles, at the same rates, and in the same manner throughout
the whole confederation; and consequently, a present apportionment of
the public debts will be as unnecessary as it would be unjust.