on must be one with which she could be contented. He considered
that the arguments which justified the admission of France to the
councils of the powers at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 applied with no less
cogency to the government of Louis Philippe than to that of Louis XVIII.
He therefore determined to acknowledge the new French government at an
early date after the notification of its assumption of power. Nor were
the other powers slow in taking the same course. It is true that
Metternich suggested a closer bond between Austria, Prussia, and Russia,
partly to restore amicable relations between Austria and Russia, partly
to oppose any possible designs of France on Italy. Prussia, fearing war,
resisted the proposal, and preferred to draw France into a guarantee of
the _status quo_ by recognising Louis Philippe. Russia was last of the
great powers to acknowledge the new _regime_ in France, and she only did
so on condition that the powers should hold the French king responsible
for the execution of the international engagements of the fallen
dynasty. Louis Philippe was certainly not the man wilfully to embroil
France in a war with her neighbours, and, had he been independent of
French public opinion, there would have been no reason to fear French
aggression.

The state which had most to fear from an aggressive France was the new
kingdom of the Netherlands. Trusting for protection to the great powers
rather than to its own forces, the Netherlands government had adopted a
system which left it almost entirely without troops except during the
military exercises of September and October. Wellington, who knew the
pacific character of the new French government, advised the garrisoning
of certain isolated points on the frontier, but thought no further
preparation necessary. A few weeks were however to prove that the new
French revolution had aroused a more implacable enemy, against whom the
house of Orange would have needed all the troops it could summon to its
aid. The union of Holland and Belgium had been resolved on by the
powers at Paris in 1814, mainly for military reasons. Austria had been
unwilling to resume the heavy burden of guarding the Belgian Netherlands
and southern Germany against French aggression, and the powers had
consequently resolved on strengthening those smaller states on whom the
duty of resistance would fall. In these days, accustomed as we are to
the distinction between the Teutonic and Latin races, it might