scertain the strength of the enemy.
The Burmese were seen upon some hills, where they were constructing
stockades. The small British force advanced against them, drove
them off the hills and, following them, prepared to attack them in
the plain beyond. The guns, however, had not come up; partly owing
to the cowardice of the elephant drivers, and partly to the fact
that it was found that several of the essential parts of the guns
had been left behind.

Without their assistance to clear the way, Captain Noton felt that
it would be imprudent to attack so great a force; and therefore
fell back to Ramoo. Here he was joined by three companies of the
20th Native Infantry, bringing up his force to close upon a
thousand; of whom about half were sepoys, and the rest native
levies. Had any energy, whatever, been shown by the officer in
command of Chittagong, in sending up reinforcements--which he could
well have spared, now that the point of attack by the Burmese had
been made clear--Captain Noton might have taken the offensive, in
which case serious disaster would have been avoided, and the
Burmese would have been driven back across the Naaf. None, however,
came and, on the morning of the 13th of May, the enemy appeared on
the hill east of Ramoo, being separated from the British force by
the river of the same name.

There was some difference of opinion, among the officers, as to
whether it would be better to maintain a position outside the town,
or to retreat at once; but the belief that reinforcements might
arrive, at any hour, caused Captain Noton to determine to keep in
the open, and so to cover the town as long as possible.

On the evening of the 14th, the Burmese came down to the river as
if to cross it; but retired when the two six-pounder guns opened
fire upon them. That two small guns should produce such an effect
confirmed the British officers in their opinion that the Burmese,
although they might defend stockades well, were of little use in
the open. The next morning, however, the enemy effected the passage
of the river farther away and then, advancing, took possession of a
large tank surrounded by a high embankment.

Captain Noton placed his force in an enclosure, with a bank three
feet high. His right flank was protected by the river; and a small
tank, some sixty paces in front, was occupied by a strong picket.
On his left, somewhat to the rear, was another tank, and at this
the native levies were placed. The ma