loss to his own troops. General
Carandolet was particularly unfortunate; twice did Zumalacarregui
surprise him; first in the pass of San Fausto, where his column was
nearly destroyed; and a second time in the town of Viana, on the Ebro.
On this last occasion the affair was decided by the Carlist cavalry,
which for the first time had an opportunity of distinguishing itself. It
consisted of 250 ill-equipped and undrilled lancers, at the head of
which Zumalacarregui put himself, and charging the Christino horsemen,
who were nearly twice as numerous, broke them and put them to flight.

It is unnecessary, and would be monotonous, to follow Zumalacarregui,
step by step, through the summer campaign of 1834, which was a most
important one for the cause he defended. With the increase of numerical
force, which his successes, and the arrival of Don Carlos, brought to
his standard, the lack of arms, money, and ammunition began to make
themselves nearly as sensibly felt as at the commencement of the war.
When Don Carlos arrived in Spain and formed a ministry, Zumalacarregui
hoped and expected that the men composing the latter would possess some
influence abroad, and would be able to procure assistance of various
kinds. In this, however, he found himself mistaken; and to make matters
worse, he appears to have been already thwarted, in his plans and
arrangements, by the persons about Don Carlos. The division of counsels,
which subsequently ruined the Carlist cause, was already beginning to be
felt.

At the arrival of Don Carlos, the army was composed entirely of
volunteers, but a levy was now ordered of all the men capable of bearing
arms. Zumalacarregui opposed this strenuously, but was finally compelled
to give way, and four new battalions were formed, although there was
scarcely a musket in store to give to them. By this ill-advised measure,
the agricultural interests of the country were materially compromised,
and new and heavy charges imposed upon the military chest, for the
maintenance of troops which, being unarmed, were of course useless. This
was a source of great vexation to Zumalacarregui, who certainly had
enough to do to make head against the enemy opposed to him, without
being compelled at the same time to procure supplies, arms, and
ammunition for his troops, and to attend, in great measure, to the
administrative arrangements, which usually fall to the charge of the
civil authorities. At the commencement of the war, f