us to
repent, since a man from being wicked becomes virtuous.

Reply Obj. 3: It would indeed be foolish to grieve for what has
already been done, with the intention of trying to make it not done.
But the penitent does not intend this: for his sorrow is displeasure
or disapproval with regard to the past deed, with the intention of
removing its result, viz. the anger of God and the debt of
punishment: and this is not foolish.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 85, Art. 2]

Whether Penance Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a special virtue. For
it seems that to rejoice at the good one has done, and to grieve for
the evil one has done are acts of the same nature. But joy for the
good one has done is not a special virtue, but is a praiseworthy
emotion proceeding from charity, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 7, 8, 9): wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity
"rejoiceth not at iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." Therefore,
in like manner, neither is penance, which is sorrow for past sins, a
special virtue, but an emotion resulting from charity.

Obj. 2: Further, every special virtue has its special matter, because
habits are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their objects.
But penance has no special matter, because its matter is past sins in
any matter whatever. Therefore penance is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is removed except by its contrary. But
penance removes all sins. Therefore it is contrary to all sins, and
consequently is not a special virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Law has a special precept about penance, as
stated above (Q. 84, AA. 5, 7).

_I answer that,_ As stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 54, A. 1, ad
1, A. 2), habits are specifically distinguished according to the
species of their acts, so that whenever an act has a special reason
for being praiseworthy, there must needs be a special habit. Now it
is evident that there is a special reason for praising the act of
penance, because it aims at the destruction of past sin, considered
as an offense against God, which does not apply to any other virtue.
We must therefore conclude that penance is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: An act springs from charity in two ways: first as being
elicited by charity, and a like virtuous act requires no other virtue
than charity, e.g. to love the good, to rejoice therein, and to
grieve for what is opposed to it. Secondl