hilosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "no
virtuous man is foolish." But it seems foolish to deplore what has
been done in the past, since it cannot be otherwise, and yet this is
what we understand by penance. Therefore penance is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue,
because "a lawgiver intends to make the citizens virtuous" (Ethic.
ii, 1). But there is a precept about penance in the Divine law,
according to Matt. 4:17: "Do penance," etc. Therefore penance is a
virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Obj. 2; Q. 84, A. 10, ad 4), to
repent is to deplore something one has done. Now it has been stated
above (Q. 84, A. 9) that sorrow or sadness is twofold. First, it
denotes a passion of the sensitive appetite, and in this sense
penance is not a virtue, but a passion. Secondly, it denotes an act
of the will, and in this way it implies choice, and if this be right,
it must, of necessity, be an act of virtue. For it is stated in
_Ethic._ ii, 6 that virtue is a habit of choosing according to right
reason. Now it belongs to right reason than one should grieve for a
proper object of grief as one ought to grieve, and for an end for
which one ought to grieve. And this is observed in the penance of
which we are speaking now; since the penitent assumes a moderated
grief for his past sins, with the intention of removing them. Hence
it is evident that the penance of which we are speaking now, is
either a virtue or the act of a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 84, A. 1, ad 1; AA. 2, 3), in the
sacrament of Penance, human acts take the place of matter, which is
not the case in Baptism and Confirmation. Wherefore, since virtue is
a principle of an act, penance is either a virtue or accompanies a
virtue, rather than Baptism or Confirmation.

Reply Obj. 2: Penance, considered as a passion, is not a virtue, as
stated above, and it is thus that it is accompanied by a bodily
alteration. On the other hand, it is a virtue, according as it
includes a right choice on the part of the will; which, however,
applies to penance rather than to shame. Because shame regards the
evil deed as present, whereas penance regards the evil deed as past.
Now it is contrary to the perfection of virtue that one should have
an evil deed actually present, of which one ought to be ashamed;
whereas it is not contrary to the perfection of virtue that we should
have previously committed evil deeds, of which it behooves