l begin at the same time to be in the soul; but
one is said to precede the other in the order of nature, which order
depends on the order of their acts, in so far as the act of one
virtue presupposes the act of another. Accordingly, then, one must
say that, even in the order of time, certain praiseworthy acts can
precede the act and the habit of penance, e.g. acts of dead faith and
hope, and an act of servile fear; while the act and habit of charity
are, in point of time, simultaneous with the act and habit of
penance, and with the habits of the other virtues. For, as was stated
in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 113, AA. 7, 8), in the justification of
the ungodly, the movement of the free-will towards God, which is an
act of faith quickened by charity, and the movement of the free-will
towards sin, which is the act of penance, are simultaneous. Yet of
these two acts, the former naturally precedes the latter, because the
act of the virtue of penance is directed against sin, through love of
God; where the first-mentioned act is the reason and cause of the
second.

Consequently penance is not simply the first of the virtues, either
in the order of time, or in the order of nature, because, in the
order of nature, the theological virtues precede it simply.
Nevertheless, in a certain respect, it is the first of the other
virtues in the order of time, as regards its act, because this act is
the first in the justification of the ungodly; whereas in the order
of nature, the other virtues seem to precede, as that which is
natural precedes that which is accidental; because the other virtues
seem to be necessary for man's good, by reason of their very nature,
whereas penance is only necessary if something, viz. sin, be
presupposed, as stated above (Q. 55, A. 2), when we spoke of the
relation of the sacrament of penance to the other sacraments
aforesaid.

Reply Obj. 1: This gloss is to be taken as meaning that the act of
penance is the first in point of time, in comparison with the acts of
the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: In successive movements withdrawal from one extreme
precedes approach to the other, in point of time; and also in the
order of nature, if we consider the subject, i.e. the order of the
material cause; but if we consider the order of the efficient and
final causes, approach to the end is first, for it is this that the
efficient cause intends first of all: and it is this order which we
consider chiefly in the acts o