ards
another person, and the matter of justice is not so much the person
to whom justice is due as the thing which is the subject of
distribution or commutation. Hence the matter of penance is not God,
but human acts, whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God is
as one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance
is not a theological virtue, because God is not its matter or object.

Reply Obj. 2: The mean of justice is the equality that is established
between those between whom justice is, as stated in _Ethic._ v. But
in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established, on account
of the excellence of one, as between father and son, God and man, as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), wherefore in such cases, he
that falls short of the other must do whatever he can. Yet this will
not be sufficient simply, but only according to the acceptance of the
higher one; and this is what is meant by ascribing excess to penance.

Reply Obj. 3: As there is a kind of commutation in favors, when, to
wit, a man gives thanks for a favor received, so also is there
commutation in the matter of offenses, when, on account of an offense
committed against another, a man is either punished against his will,
which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of his own
accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the
sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge.
Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative
justice.

Reply Obj. 4: Although penance is directly a species of justice, yet,
in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the virtues; for
inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God, it must have a
share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the object of
which is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in Christ's
Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for pardon, and
hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as it is a moral
virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral
virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not only
something belonging to justice, but also something belonging to
temperance and fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause
pleasure, and which pertain to temperance, and those which cause
terror, which fortitude moderates, are objects of commutative
justice. Accordingly it belongs to justice both to abstain from
pleasure, which belongs to tempe