ing sleep, 137,172;
co-operation of, in correction, of illusion, 352.
Volkelt, J., 172.
W.
Weber, E.H., 43.
Weinhold, Professor, 186.
Wetness, perception of, 53.
Wheatstone, Sir C, 75.
Wheel of life, 56.
Will. _See_ Volition.
Wordsworth, W., 281.
World, our estimate of, 323, 326, 327;
scientific conception of material, 8, 36, 343, 344;
reality of external, 344-346, 349, 353, 355, 360.
Wundt, Professor, W. 13, note[2], 31, note[11], 32, note[12], 58,
note[27], 67, note[34], 75, 93, note[47], 118, note[63], 136,
note[77], 139, 143, 177, 246, 247, note[119], 251, 252, 254.
THE END
FOOTNOTES:
[1] A history of the distinction is given by Brierre de Boismont, in his
work _On Illusions_ (translated by R. T. Hulme, 1859). He says that
Arnold (1806) first defined hallucination, and distinguished it from
illusion. Esquirol, in his work, _Des Maladies Mentales_ (1838), may be
said to have fixed the distinction. (See Hunt's translation, 1845, p.
111.)
[2] This fact has been fully recognized by writers on the pathology of
the subject; for example, Griesinger, _Mental Pathology and
Therapeutics_ (London, 1867), p. 84; Baillarger, article, "Des
Hallucinations," in the _Memoires de l'Academie Royale de Medecine_,
tom. xii. p. 273, etc; Wundt, _Physiologische Psychologie_, p. 653.
[3] I here touch on the distinction between the psychological and the
philosophical view of perception, to be brought out more fully
by-and-by.
[4] It might even be urged that the order here adopted is scientifically
the best, since sense-perception is the earliest form of knowledge,
introspected facts being known only in relation to perceived facts. But
if the mind's knowledge of its own states is thus later in time, it is
earlier in the logical order, that is to say, it is the most strictly
presentative form of knowledge.
[5] Here and elsewhere I use the word "impression" for the whole complex
of sensation which is present at the moment. It may, perhaps, not be
unnecessary to add that, in employing this term, I am making no
assumption about the independent existence of external objects.
[6] Psychological usage has now pretty well substituted the term "image"
for "idea," in order to indicate an individual (as distinguished from a
general) representation of a sensation or percept. It might, perhaps, be
desirable to go further in this process of differentiating langua
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