degree of similarity and continuity of
character in our successive mental states, is complementary to the other
condition, constant change, already referred to. It may, perhaps, be
said that all clear consciousness lies between two extremes of excessive
sameness and excessive difference.
[134] It follows that any great transformation of our environment may
lead to a partial confusion with respect to self. For not only do great
and violent changes in our surroundings beget profound changes in our
feelings and ideas, but since the idea of self is under one of its
aspects essentially that of a relation to not-self, any great revolution
in the one term, will confuse the recognition of the other. This fact is
expressed in the common expression that we "lose ourselves" when in
unfamiliar surroundings, and the process of orientation, or "taking our
bearings," fails.
[135] On these disturbances of memory and self-recognition in insanity,
see Griesinger, _op. cit._, pp. 49-51; also Ribot, "Des Desordres
Generaux de la Memoire," in the _Revue Philosophique_, August, 1880. It
is related by Leuret (_Fragments Psych. sur la Folie_, p. 277) that a
patient spoke of his former self as "la personne de moi-meme."
[136] In the following account of the process of belief and its errors,
I am going over some of the ground traversed by my essay on _Belief, its
Varieties and Conditions_ ("Sensation and Intuition," ch. iv.). To this
essay I must refer the reader for a fuller analysis of the subject.
[137] For an account of the difference of mechanism in memory and
expectation, see Taine, _De l'Intelligence_, 2ieme partie, livre
premier, ch. ii. sec. 6.
[138] J.S. Mill distinguishes expectation as a radically distinct mode
of belief from memory, but does not bring out the contrast with respect
to activity here emphasized (James Mill's _Analysis of the Human Mind_,
edited by J.S. Mill, p. 411, etc.). For a fuller statement of my view of
the relation of belief to action, as compared with that of Professor
Bain, see my earlier work.
[139] For some good remarks on the logical aspects of future events as
matters of fact, see Mr. Venn's _Logic of Chance_, ch. x.
[140] James Mill's _Analysis of the Human Mind_, edited by J.S. Mill,
vol. i p. 414, _et seq._
[141] _Principles of Geology_, ch. iii.
[142] To make this rough analysis more complete, I ought, perhaps, to
include the effect of all the errors of introspection, memory, and
s
|