say, in believing that there neither
was nor could be such a thing as ice."
"But this seems ridiculous," said Fellowes; "for according to this,
different and opposite experiences may, in different places give
different or opposite measures of the laws of nature; which
nevertheless are supposed to be invariably the same, or invariably
the limits certified by that experience."
"I cannot help it; upon that same experience we must believe it true
that there are no miracles, and our unbelieving prince, that there
could be no such thing as ice; for to him it was a miracle. If we do
not reason thus, may we not be compelled to admit that our uniform
experience, with its limited variations, is no rule at all, and that
there are cases for which it makes no provision? and may not the
advocate for miracles say that miracles are amongst them? No, let us
adhere to our principle, and adhering to it, I wish to know whether
the prince in question was not quite right in saying that there
neither was nor could be such a thing as ice; for the assertion that
there was, was contrary to all his experience and to that of every soul
about him."
"I must say, that, if we look only to the principle of this uniform
experience, he was right."
"But he rejected the truth."
"He certainly did."
"And he was right in rejecting the truth?"
"Certainly, upon your principle."
"Upon my principle! Do not say upon my principle, unless you mean to
deny that you too embrace it; if you give up that principle, you lay
yourself open at once to the retort that your position is insecure;
that you have taken your experience as a sufficient criterion of the
possibilities of events, when it is in fact merely a measure of such
as have fallen under your own observation."
"Perhaps," said Fellowes, "I should say that the prince in question
was justified at first in rejecting the fact, but that when he found
other men, whose veracity he could not suspect, coming from the same
regions of the world, and affirming the same phenomenon, it was his
business to correct his experience, and to admit that the fact
was so."
"I am surprised to hear you say so; you are again ruining our principle.
Do you admit that the assertion that there was a place on earth at
which water in large quantities became solid, was apparently as great
a violation of all the experience of this man, as what is ordinarily
called a miracle is of ours?"
"I cannot deny that it was so."
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