h testimony as I have supposed, to enable
us to see whether we are prepared to admit the truth of your principle
that no evidence can establish a miracle. Once more, then, I ask you
whether, on supposition of such testimony, you would reject the
supposed fact or not?"
"Well, then, I should say, that, since no testimony can establish a
miracle, I should reject it."
"Bravo, Fellowes! I do of all things like to see an unflinching
regard to a principle, when once laid down."
"But would not you also reject it, upon the same principle?"
"Of course I should, if the principle be true; but ah! my friend,
pardon me for acknowledging my infirmities; my miserable scepticism
tosses me to and fro. I have not your strength of will; and I fear
that the rejection in such a case would cost me many qualms and
doubts. Such is the infirmity of our nature, and so much may be
said on all sides! And I fear that I should be more likely to have
these uneasy thoughts, inasmuch as I fancy I see a difficult
dilemma (I but now referred to it), which would be proposed to us by
some keen-sighted opponent,--I say not with justice,--who would
endeavor to show that we had abandoned our principle in the very
attempt to maintain it; that the bow from which we were about to
launch so fatal an arrow at the enemy had broken in our hands, and
left us defenceless."
"What dilemma do you refer to?" said Fellowes.
"I think such an adversary might perhaps say: 'That same uniform
experience on which you justify the rejection of all miracles,--does
it extend only to one part of nature, to the physical and material
only, or to the mental and spiritual also?' In other words, if there
were such things as miracles at all, might there be miracles in
connection with mind as well as in connection with matter? What would
you say?"
"What can I say, but what Hume himself says, so truly and so
beautifully, in his essay on 'Necessary Connection,' and 'On Liberty
and Necessity'; namely, that there is a uniformity in both the moral
and physical world, and that nature does not transgress certain
limits in either the one or the other'? You must remember that he
says so?"
"I do," said Harrington. "Now, I am afraid our astute adversary would
say that such a complication of false testimony as we have supposed
would itself be a flagrant violation of the established series of
sequences, on which, as applied to the physical world, we justify
the rejection of all miracl
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