pty
name. Every thing in the process of the mind's development goes to
show, that, whatever its capacities, tendencies, faculties,
"potentialities," (call them what you will,) a certain external
influence is necessary to awaken its dormant life; to turn a
"potentiality" into an "energy "; to transform a dim inkling of a
truth into an intelligent, vital, conscious recognition of it.
Nor is this law confined to mind alone; all nature attests its
presence. All effects are the result of properties or susceptibilities
in one thing, solicited by external contact with those of others.
The fire no doubt may smoulder in the dull and languid embers; it
is when the external breeze sweeps over them, that they begin to
sparkle and glow, and vindicate the vital element they contain. The
diamond in the mine has the same internal properties in the darkness
as in the light; it is not till the sun shines upon it, that it
flashes on the eye its splendor. Look at a flower of any particular
species; we see that, as it is developed in connection with a variety
of external influences,--as it comes successively under the action
of the sun, rain, dew, soil,--it expands in a particular manner, and
in that only. It exhibits a certain configuration of parts, a certain
form of leaf, a certain color, fragrance, and no other. We do not doubt,
on the one hand, that without the "skyey influences" these things would
never have been; nor, on the other; that the flower assumes this form
of development, and this alone, in virtue of its internal structure and
organization. But both sets of conditions must conspire in the result.
It is much the same with the mind. That it possesses certain tendencies
and faculties, which, as it develops itself, will terminate in certain
ideas and sentiments, is admitted; but apart from certain external
conditions of development, those sentiments and ideas will, in effect,
never be formed,--the mind will be in perpetual slumber. Thus, in point
of fact, this controversy is connected ultimately with that ancient
dispute as to the origin, sources, and genesis of human knowledge and
sentiments. I shall simply take for granted that you are (as most
philosophers are) an advocate of innate capacities, but not of "innate
ideas"; of "innate susceptibilities," but not of "innate sentiments";
that is, I presume you do not contend that the mind possesses more than
the faculties--the laws of thought and feeling--which, under conditions
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