ation to Caesar. While, of the two
confederate regents, Pompeius had utterly failed in the functions
which he had undertaken, Caesar had the skill to turn his official
position to an account which left all calculations and all fears
far behind. Without much inquiry as to permission, Caesar
had doubled his army by levies in his southern province inhabited
in great measure by Roman burgesses; had with this army crossed
the Alps instead of keeping watch over Rome from Northern Italy;
had crushed in the bud a new Cimbrian invasion, and within two years
(696, 697) had carried the Roman arms to the Rhine and the Channel.
In presence of such facts even the aristocratic tactics of ignoring
and disparaging were baffled. He who had often been scoffed
at as effeminate was now the idol of the army, the celebrated victory-
crowned hero, whose fresh laurels outshone the faded laurels
of Pompeius, and to whom even the senate as early as 697 accorded
the demonstrations of honour usual after successful campaigns
in richer measure than had ever fallen to the share of Pompeius.
Pompeius stood towards his former adjutant precisely
as after the Gabinio-Manilian laws the latter had stood towards him.
Caesar was now the hero of the day and the master of the most powerful
Roman army; Pompeius was an ex-general who had once been famous.
It is true that no collision had yet occurred between father-in-law
and son-in-law, and the relation was externally undisturbed;
but every political alliance is inwardly broken up, when the relative
proportions of the power of the parties are materially altered.
While the quarrel with Clodius was merely annoying, the change
in the position of Caesar involved a very serious danger for Pompeius;
just as Caesar and his confederates had formerly sought a military
support against him, he found himself now compelled to seek a military
support against Caesar, and, laying aside his haughty privacy,
to come forward as a candidate for some extraordinary magistracy,
which would enable him to hold his place by the side of the governor
of the two Gauls with equal and, if possible, with superior power.
His tactics, like his position, were exactly those of Caesar
during the Mithradatic war. To balance the military power
of a superior but still remote adversary by the obtaining
of a similar command, Pompeius required in the first instance
the official machinery of government. A year and a half ago
this had been absolutely