moral support to Pompeius in the repressive measures
which the latter took against the stubborn republican opposition.

Dictatorship of Pompeius
Covert Attacks by Pompeius on Caesar

It was only after Pompeius had in this way procured for himself
at the beginning of 702 the undivided consulship and an influence
in the capital thoroughly outweighing that of Caesar,
and after all the men capable of arms in Italy had tendered
their military oath to himself personally and in his name,
that he formed the resolution to break as soon as possible
formally with Caesar; and the design became distinctly enough apparent.
That the judicial prosecution which took place after the tumult
on the Appian Way lighted with unsparing severity precisely
on the old democratic partisans of Caesar,(12) might perhaps pass
as a mere awkwardness. That the new law against electioneering intrigues,
which had retrospective effect as far as 684, included also the dubious
proceedings at Caesar's candidature for the consulship,(13)
might likewise be nothing more, although not a few Caesarians thought
that they perceived in it a definite design. But people
could no longer shut their eyes, however willing they might be
to do so, when Pompeius did not select for his colleague
in the consulship his former father-in-law Caesar, as was fitting
in the circumstances of the case and was in many quarters demanded,
but associated with himself a puppet wholly dependent on him
in his new father-in-law Scipio;(14) and still less, when Pompeius
at the same time got the governorship of the two Spains continued
to him for five years more, that is to 709, and a considerable
fixed sum appropriated from the state-chest for the payment of his troops,
not only without stipulating for a like prolongation of command
and a like grant of money to Caesar, but even while labouring
ulteriorly to effect the recall of Caesar before the term
formerly agreed on through the new regulations which were issued
at the same time regarding the holding of the governorships.
These encroachments were unmistakeably calculated to undermine
Caesar's position and eventually to overthrow him. The moment
could not be more favourable. Caesar had conceded so much to Pompeius
at Luca, only because Crassus and his Syrian army would necessarily,
in the event of any rupture with Pompeius, be thrown into Caesar's scale;
for upon Crassus--who since the times of Sulla had been
at the deepest enmity with