e, neither Wilkes nor Buckhurst can be found guilty of
treachery or animosity towards him, but are proved to have been governed,
in all their conduct, by a strong sense of duty to their sovereign, the
Netherlands, and Leicester himself.

To Sir John Norris, it must be allowed, that he was never fickle, for he
had always entertained for that distinguished general an honest,
unswerving, and infinite hatred, which was not susceptible of increase or
diminution by any act or word. Pelham, too, whose days were numbered, and
who was dying bankrupt and broken-hearted, at the close of the, Earl's
administration, had always been regarded by him with tenderness and
affection. But Pelham had never thwarted him, had exposed his life for
him, and was always proud of being his faithful, unquestioning, humble
adherent. With perhaps this single exception, Leicester found himself at
the end of his second term in the Provinces, without a single friend and
with few respectable partisans. Subordinate mischievous intriguers like
Deventer, Junius, and Otheman, were his chief advisers and the
instruments of his schemes.

With such qualifications it was hardly possible--even if the current of
affairs had been flowing smoothly--that he should prove a successful
governor of the new republic. But when the numerous errors and
adventitious circumstances are considered--for some of which he was
responsible, while of others he was the victim--it must be esteemed
fortunate that no great catastrophe occurred. His immoderate elevation;
his sudden degradation, his controversy in regard to the sovereignty, his
abrupt departure for England, his protracted absence, his mistimed
return, the secret instructions for his second administration, the
obstinate parsimony and persistent ill-temper of the Queen--who, from the
beginning to the end of the Earl's government, never addressed a kindly
word to the Netherlanders, but was ever censuring and brow beating them
in public state-papers and private epistles--the treason of York and
Stanley, above all, the disastrous and concealed negotiations with Parma,
and the desperate attempts upon Amsterdam and Leyden--all placed him in a
most unfortunate position from first to last. But he was not competent
for his post under any circumstances. He was not the statesman to deal in
policy with Buys, Barneveld, Ortel, Sainte Aldegonde; nor the soldier to
measure himself against Alexander Farnese. His administration was a
failur