FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   10   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29   30   31   32   33   34  
35   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43   44   45   46   47   48   49   50   51   52   53   54   55   56   57   58   59   >>   >|  
sion. Immediately after the closing the President of the Exchange visited the prominent bank president who had served notice at the last moment of his disapproval of this procedure. He was found in his office in consultation with a member of one of the great private banking houses. Both the bank president and the private banker agreed that, in their opinion, the closing had been a most unfortunate mistake. It was an opportunity thrown away to make New York the financial center of the world. The damage was done and would have to be made the best of, but had the market been allowed to open the banks would have come to the rescue and all would have gone well. These gentlemen admitted that the Exchange was to some extent excusable owing to the negligence of the bankers in not notifying them that they were ready to protect the money market. It may safely be stated that within twenty-four hours after this interview neither the two bankers in question nor any one else in Wall Street entertained these opinions. The rise of exchange on London to $7--a rate never before witnessed; the marking of the Bank of England's official discount rate to 10%, accompanied by a run on that institution which resulted in a loss of gold in one week of $52,500,000; the decline of the Bank's ratio of reserve from the low figure of 40% to the paralyzing figure of 14-5/8%; together with the fact that the surplus reserves of our New York Clearing House banks fell $50,000,000 below their legal requirements, were reasons enough in themselves to convince the most skeptical of the necessity of what had been done. The frightful gravity of the situation which had arisen became clearer and more defined in people's minds a few days after the first of August than it was on the morning of July 31st. European selling had been proceeding for some time before the outbreak of War and in the last few days before closing had been temporarily arrested by the prohibitive level of exchange and the risk of shipment at sea. The American public itself, however, was seized with panic on the evening of July 30th, and on the morning of July 31st brokers' offices were flooded with orders to sell securities for what they would bring and without reference to values. Had the market been permitted to open on that Friday morning the familiar Wall Street tradition of "Black Friday" would have had a meaning more sinister than ever had been dreamed of before. In all previous
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   10   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29   30   31   32   33   34  
35   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43   44   45   46   47   48   49   50   51   52   53   54   55   56   57   58   59   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

market

 

closing

 
morning
 
figure
 
exchange
 

Street

 

bankers

 

Exchange

 

private

 

Friday


president

 

frightful

 

gravity

 

meaning

 

tradition

 
situation
 

requirements

 
convince
 

necessity

 
reasons

skeptical

 

sinister

 
paralyzing
 

previous

 

reserve

 

dreamed

 

arisen

 

Clearing

 

reserves

 

surplus


defined

 
arrested
 

prohibitive

 

offices

 

brokers

 

temporarily

 

outbreak

 

orders

 

flooded

 

American


public

 

evening

 

shipment

 

permitted

 

August

 

people

 
clearer
 
familiar
 
seized
 

values