ry
to preserve in his front an open space fully six miles in depth,
extending to the banks of the Opequon, meaning not only to have
the first tidings of any offensive movement by the enemy, but also
that when himself ready to move he might be able to take the enemy
by surprise.
On the evening of the 18th of September, part of Early's cavalry
was at Martinsburg, Gordon occupied Bunker Hill, Wharton was at
Stephenson's, with Rodes closing back on him, while Ramseur alone
covered Winchester in the path of Sheridan's advance. Sheridan
naturally supposed that in a quick movement he would have two
divisions to deal with after crossing the Opequon.
At two o'clock on the morning of Monday, the 19th of September, on
the very day when Sheridan had told Grant he would be ready to
move, but just three hours earlier, Sheridan put his army in motion
toward the Opequon, covering his flank by directing Merritt and
Averell on Stephenson's. He sent Wilson rapidly ahead on the
Berryville road to carry the ford and to seize the long and deep
defile on the left or east bank through which the main column would
have to advance. Wright was to lead the infantry, closely followed
by Emory, who, in order to solidify the movement, was instructed
to take his orders from Wright after reaching the ford. Crook,
coming in from his more distant position, would naturally fall in
the rear of the others, and he was to mass his men in reserve,
covering the ford. Wright had to move partly across country, and
had farther to go than Emory. Although both started punctually at
the appointed hour, it happened that, about five o'clock, the head
of Wright's column ran into Emory's in march near the crest, whence
the road sweeps down to the Opequon. There Emory halted, by Wright's
orders, to let the Sixth Corps pass. Unfortunately, minute and
thorough as Sheridan's plans and instructions were, he appears to
have underrated the double difficulty of crossing the ford and
threading the long defile, for to this cause must be attributed
the presence of Wright's entire wagon-train in the rear of his
corps, as well as the excess of artillery for the work and the
field. The head of the column could move but slowly; thus the rear
was so long retarded, that, although the crossing began about six
o'clock, and the whole movement was urged on by Sheridan, Wright,
and Emory, and indeed by every one, it wanted but twenty minutes
of noon when the line of battle was f
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