d acts.

[92] On December 20, 1914.

[93] Italian Green Book, Despatch N. 8.

One of the many wily devices by which the German Ambassador sought to
inveigle the Consulta into forgoing its right to resort to war was
employed within three weeks of the beginning of negotiations. Buelow
confidentially informed Sonnino that Germany was sending Count von
Wedel to Vienna to persuade the Cabinet there to cede the Trentino to
Italy, and asked him whether, if Austria acquiesced, it would not be
possible to announce to the Chamber that the Italian Government had
already in hand enough to warrant it in assuming that the main
aspirations of the nation would be realized.[94] "Absolutely
impossible," was Sonnino's reply. But the Dictator Giolitti, whom
Prince Buelow took into partnership, was more confident and pliable.
This parliamentary leader, whose will was law in his own country and
whose life-work consisted in eliminating ethical principles from
politics, made known his belief--nay, his positive knowledge--that by
diplomatic negotiations the nation could obtain concessions which
would dispense it from embarking on the war. This pronouncement had a
widespread effect on public opinion, confirming the prevalent belief
that Austria would satisfy Italy's claims.

[94] Italian Green Book, January 14, 1915, Despatch N. 11.

There was no means of verifying those announcements, for the Rome
Government scrupulously observed its part of the compact, and allowed
no news of the progress of the conversations to leak out. In fact, it
went much farther and deprived the Italian people systematically of
all information on the subject of the crisis. Consequently the
poisoners of the wells of truth had a facile task.

It was no secret, however, that the cession of the Trentino would not
suffice to square accounts. Italy's land and sea frontiers were
strategically so exposed that it was sheer impossible to provide
adequately for their defence. And this essential defect rendered the
nation semi-dependent on its neighbour and adversary and powerless to
pursue a policy of its own. For half a century this dangerous flaw in
the national edifice and its pernicious effects on Italy's
international relations had been patiently borne with, but Baron
Sonnino considered that the time for repairing it and strengthening
the groundwork of peace had come. And as he had not the faintest doubt
that technically as well as essentially he had right o