cut deep into the political
situation. A convention was signed in Stamboul between the Turkish and
Bulgarian Governments by which the former ceded to Bulgaria the
Turkish section of the Dedeagatch railway--that is to say, the whole
line that runs on Turkish territory, together with the stations of
Dimotika, Kulela-Burgas, and Karagatch. The new boundary ran
thenceforward parallel to the river Maritza, all the territory
eastward of that becoming Bulgarian.

[103] July 22, 1915.

And this concession, King Ferdinand's ministers would have Europe
believe, was devoid of political bearings. It was merely a case of
something being given for nothing. And the Allies allowed themselves
to be persuaded that this was the real significance of the deal. The
German Press was more frank. It announced that the relations between
Bulgaria and Turkey had entered upon a decisive phase and that all
fear of Bulgaria's taking part in the war on the side of the Allies
had been definitely dispelled.

The Bulgarian problem throughout all that wearisome crisis, which
ended by Ferdinand throwing off the mask, was in reality simple, and
the known or verifiable facts ought to have been sufficient to bring
the judgment of the Entente statesmen to conclusions which would have
enabled them to steer clear of the costly blunders that characterized
their policy. The line of action followed from first to last by
Ferdinand was supremely inelastic: only its manifestations, of which
the object was to deceive, were varied and conflicting. It was bound
up with Austria's undertaking to restore Macedonia to Bulgaria and to
maintain Ferdinand on the throne. This twofold promise was the bait by
which the king was caught and kept in Austria's toils, while the
Bulgarian people was moved by patriotism to identify its cause with
that of Ferdinand. And the arrangement was to my knowledge completed
before the opening of the European war. Evidence of its existence was
forthcoming, but the statesmen of the Entente, who allowed
preconceived notions to overrule the testimony of their senses,
declined to accept it. Since then the Bulgarian Cabinet, in the person
of the Premier, has publicly admitted the truth of my reiterated
statement. In a public speech, delivered in March 1916, "M.
Radoslavoff confessed that Bulgaria had entered the war by reason of
certain obligations which she had assumed."[104]

[104] Cf. _Daily Telegraph_, March 14, 1916, in telegram from