us increased by
twenty-five per cent. The Western allies, on the other hand, were
paying huge sums for corn to neutrals. As in the long run all Entente
Powers will have to bear their share of eventual losses, it behoved
them to prevent or moderate them. And this they accomplished to a
limited extent. It might have been well to go further into the matter
and consider the advisability of entering into closer partnership than
was established by their concerted efforts in Paris. An economic
league with privileges for importation and exportation accorded to all
its members--and only to these--not merely during the war but for a
series of years after the conclusion of peace, might perhaps have
tended to solve that and kindred problems. But the Allied Governments
were constitutionally averse to taking long views or adopting
comprehensive measures.
But the reopening of the Dardanelles and the liberation of Russia's
corn supplies called for immediate attention and a concrete plan of
campaign. The idea of rigging out a naval and military expedition had
been mooted in London before the Financial Conference in Paris, but on
grounds which do not yet constitute materials for public history it
was dropped. At the Conference the scheme was again taken up, and the
previous objections to its execution having been successfully met it
was unanimously accepted. It is worth observing that the original
plan, so far as the present writer was cognizant of it, was coherent,
adequate and feasible, and involved co-ordination on the part of all
three Allies. It did not contemplate a purely naval expedition to the
Dardanelles, but provided for a mixed force of land and sea troops, of
which the number was considerable and under the conditions then
prevalent might also have been ample for the purpose. Although the
Allies had thus made what they believed to be adequate provision for
the success of their project, they took measures to render assurance
doubly sure. They entered into pourparlers with Greece, from whose
co-operation they anticipated advantages which would tell with
decisive force not only on the outcome of the expedition but also on
the upshot of the war.
Venizelos was approached and sounded on the subject. His authority in
his country, like that of Bismarck on the eve of his fall, was held to
be supreme. For he had saved Greece from anarchy and the dynasty from
banishment; he had reorganized the army, strengthened the navy,
establish
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