an life before it could be brought to an
end. I commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious
side. I was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative
of that side of the controversy. It is a significant and gratifying
fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous
move. I hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end.
APPENDIX.
REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES ARMIES
1864-65.
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 22,
1865.
HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations
of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to
command the same.
From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea
that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be
brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary
to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and his
numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this,
we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to
garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to
protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.
The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert,
like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to
use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for
transporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most
vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of
inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of
producing, for the support of their armies. It was a question whether
our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by
these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.
From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had
that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both
North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely
broken.
I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops
practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from
using the same force at different seasons against first one and then
another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and
producing necessary supplies
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