ordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted in
driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.
On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad
bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the enemy's cavalry.
General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it
until relieved by the 6th corps and General Smith's command, which had
just arrived, via White House, from General Butler's army.
On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the 6th corps
and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in
readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our
carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the
right of the 6th corps, and in front of General Smith. During the
attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged
in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance.
That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the
day, but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for
an attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's
works, in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt
our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe,
was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made from the
Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to
compensate for our own losses. I would not be understood as saying that
all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished
as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy
severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of
the rebellion.
From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was
impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the
city. I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and
invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right
flank to the south side of the James. While the former might have been
better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground
satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and
east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long,
vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and
that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave
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