s
movement two plans presented themselves: One to cross the Rapidan below
Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left.
Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections.
By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring
Richmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route, all we
did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out;
besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed
how to cooperate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be
used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or
James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower
route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F.
Butler:

"FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.

"GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence
at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative
action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be
accomplished.

"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large
ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding
on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally
speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to
the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to
guard. By such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy
and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to
guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of
the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and
Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be
directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we
can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of
the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it
impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I
propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems
practicable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base,
Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces
from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--I should say
not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south
side of James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the force
yo