en the United States and Germany with those between the United
States and Great Britain. The cases are different, but, even if they
were the same, it would be necessary to treat with each nation
separately. My personal preference has been to repeat our insistence
that the Allies shall not interfere with our commerce with neutral
countries, but the difference on this point was a matter of judgment
and not a matter of principle. In the note to Great Britain, dated
March 30, this Government said:

In view of these assurances formally given to this
Government, it is confidently expected that the extensive
powers conferred by the Order in Council on the executive
officers of the Crown will be restricted by "orders issued
by the Government" directing the exercise of their
discretionary powers in such a manner as to modify in
practical application those provisions of the Order in
Council which, if strictly enforced, would violate neutral
rights and interrupt legitimate trade. Relying on the
faithful performance of these voluntary assurances by his
Majesty's Government the United States takes it for granted
that the approach of American merchantmen to neutral ports
situated upon the long line of coast affected by the Order
in Council will not be interfered with, when it is known
that they do not carry goods which are contraband of war or
goods destined to or proceeding from ports within the
belligerent territory affected.

There is no doubt that our Government will insist upon this
position--that is an important thing, the exact date of the note is
not material. My reason for desiring to have the matter presented to
Great Britain at once was not that Germany had any right to ask it,
but because I was anxious to make it as easy as possible for Germany
to accept the demands of the United States and cease to employ
submarines against merchantmen.

There is no reason why any German-Americans should doubt the
President's intentions in this matter. I am sure that every one upon
reflection recognizes that our duty to prevent loss of life is more
urgent than our duty to prevent interference with trade--loss of trade
can be compensated for with money, but no settlement that the United
States and Germany may reach can call back to life those who went down
with the Lusitania--and war would be the most expensive of all
settlements because it would eno