t note, but the difference was not so material as to justify a
refusal to sign it. Then, too, I was at that time hoping that certain
things would be done which would make it easier for Germany to
acquiesce in our demands.

The three things which I had in mind which, in my judgment, would have
helped the situation were: First, an announcement of a willingness
upon our part to employ the principle of investigation, embodied in
our thirty peace treaties; second, action which would prevent American
citizens from traveling on belligerent ships or on American ships
carrying contraband, especially if that contraband consisted of
ammunition; and, third, further insistence upon our protest against
interference of our trade with neutrals. I thought that these three
things were within the range of possibilities, and that two, or at
least one was probable.

Some weeks have elapsed since the first note was sent, and we have not
only failed to do any of these things hoped for, but Germany has in
the meantime answered and in her answer has not only presented a
number of alleged facts which, in her judgment, justified the
deviation which she has made from the ordinary rules applicable to
prize cases, but she has suggested arbitration. A rejection of the
arguments which she presented and of the allegations made, together
with a reiteration of the original demands, creates a very different
situation from that which existed when the first demand was made.

As I have before stated, my fear has been that, owing to the feeling
existing in Germany, the Government might, upon receipt of such a note
under such circumstances, break off diplomatic relations and thus
create a situation out of which war might come without the intention
of either side. I am sure that the President does not want war and I
am confident that our people do not want war; I have no reason to
believe that either the German Government or the German people desire
war.

But war, a calamity at any time, is especially to be avoided now
because our nation is relied upon by both neutrals and belligerents as
the one nation which can exert most influence toward bringing this war
to an end. If we were, by accident, to be drawn into the conflict, we
would not only surrender the opportunity to act as a mediator, but we
might become responsible for drawing other nations into this contest.
When we see how one nation after another has been dragged into this
war we cannot have confid